The following came from a 1994 article by Charles Munger, best known as one of the lead Berkshire Hathaway investors with Warren Buffett.
As a warning, its very long and talks about a lot of topics from role of math and psychology, business management, stock picking, etc but its very informative.
I've picked out a few more juicy paragraphs from it but if you have time, make sure to read it. I've broken it up into several smaller chunks that I found interesting and will post them out over a few days.
Source: (Courtesy: The Big Picture)
Charles Munger, USC Business School, 1994
A Lesson on Elementary, Worldly Wisdom As It Relates To Investment Management & Business
As a warning, its very long and talks about a lot of topics from role of math and psychology, business management, stock picking, etc but its very informative.
I've picked out a few more juicy paragraphs from it but if you have time, make sure to read it. I've broken it up into several smaller chunks that I found interesting and will post them out over a few days.
Source: (Courtesy: The Big Picture)
Charles Munger, USC Business School, 1994
A Lesson on Elementary, Worldly Wisdom As It Relates To Investment Management & Business
See Part 1 - Value Investing
See Part 2 - Fewer But Bigger Bets
See Part 3 - Efficient Market Hypothesis & Race Tracking Betting Model
See Part 4 - Advantages & Disadvantages of Scale
See Part 5 - Bureaucracy & Yes Men
See Part 6 - Efficiencies & Profitability Differences from Competition
See Part 7 - Negative Effects of Technology on Business Profits
See Part 8 - Focusing on Your Competitive Edge & Follies of Investment Management
See Part 9 - Sector Rotation & Yearly tax avoidance
See Part 2 - Fewer But Bigger Bets
See Part 3 - Efficient Market Hypothesis & Race Tracking Betting Model
See Part 4 - Advantages & Disadvantages of Scale
See Part 5 - Bureaucracy & Yes Men
See Part 6 - Efficiencies & Profitability Differences from Competition
See Part 7 - Negative Effects of Technology on Business Profits
See Part 8 - Focusing on Your Competitive Edge & Follies of Investment Management
See Part 9 - Sector Rotation & Yearly tax avoidance
- Sometimes technology improvements don't benefit the company
The great lesson in microeconomics is to discriminate between when technology is going to help you and when it’s going to kill you. And most people do not get this straight in their heads. But a fellow like Buffett does.
For example, when we were in the textile business, which is a terrible commodity business, we were making low-end textiles—which are a real commodity product. And one day, the people came to Warren and said, “They’ve invented a new loom that we think will do twice as much work as our old ones.”
And Warren said, “Gee, I hope this doesn’t work because if it does, I’m going to close the mill.” And he meant it.
What was he thinking? He was thinking, “It’s a lousy business. We’re earning substandard returns and keeping it open just to be nice to the elderly workers. But we’re not going to put huge amounts of new capital into a lousy business.”
And he knew that the huge productivity increases that would come from a better machine introduced into the production of a commodity product would all go to the benefit of the buyers of the textiles. Nothing was going to stick to our ribs as owners.
That’s such an obvious concept—that there are all kinds of wonderful new inventions that give you nothing as owners except the opportunity to spend a lot more money in a business that’s still going to be lousy. The money still won’t come to you. All of the advantages from great improvements are going to flow through to the customers.
Conversely, if you own the only newspaper in Oshkosh and they were to invent more efficient ways of composing the whole newspaper, then when you got rid of the old technology and got new fancy computers and so forth, all of the savings would come right through to the bottom line.
In all cases, the people who sell the machinery—and, by and large, even the internal bureaucrats urging you to buy the equipment—show you projections with the amount you’ll save at current prices with the new technology. However, they don’t do the second step of theanalysis which is to determine how much is going stay home and how much is just going to flow through to the customer. I’ve never seen a single projection incorporating that second step in my life. And I see them all the time. Rather, they always read: “This capital outlay will save you so much money that it will pay for itself in three years.”
So you keep buying things that will pay for themselves in three years. And after 20 years of doing it, somehow you’ve earned a return of only about 4% per annum. That’s the textile business.
And it isn’t that the machines weren’t better. It’s just that the savings didn’t go to you. The cost reductions came through all right. But the benefit of the cost reductions didn’t go to the guy who bought the equipment. It’s such a simple idea. It’s so basic.
For example, when we were in the textile business, which is a terrible commodity business, we were making low-end textiles—which are a real commodity product. And one day, the people came to Warren and said, “They’ve invented a new loom that we think will do twice as much work as our old ones.”
And Warren said, “Gee, I hope this doesn’t work because if it does, I’m going to close the mill.” And he meant it.
What was he thinking? He was thinking, “It’s a lousy business. We’re earning substandard returns and keeping it open just to be nice to the elderly workers. But we’re not going to put huge amounts of new capital into a lousy business.”
And he knew that the huge productivity increases that would come from a better machine introduced into the production of a commodity product would all go to the benefit of the buyers of the textiles. Nothing was going to stick to our ribs as owners.
That’s such an obvious concept—that there are all kinds of wonderful new inventions that give you nothing as owners except the opportunity to spend a lot more money in a business that’s still going to be lousy. The money still won’t come to you. All of the advantages from great improvements are going to flow through to the customers.
Conversely, if you own the only newspaper in Oshkosh and they were to invent more efficient ways of composing the whole newspaper, then when you got rid of the old technology and got new fancy computers and so forth, all of the savings would come right through to the bottom line.
In all cases, the people who sell the machinery—and, by and large, even the internal bureaucrats urging you to buy the equipment—show you projections with the amount you’ll save at current prices with the new technology. However, they don’t do the second step of theanalysis which is to determine how much is going stay home and how much is just going to flow through to the customer. I’ve never seen a single projection incorporating that second step in my life. And I see them all the time. Rather, they always read: “This capital outlay will save you so much money that it will pay for itself in three years.”
So you keep buying things that will pay for themselves in three years. And after 20 years of doing it, somehow you’ve earned a return of only about 4% per annum. That’s the textile business.
And it isn’t that the machines weren’t better. It’s just that the savings didn’t go to you. The cost reductions came through all right. But the benefit of the cost reductions didn’t go to the guy who bought the equipment. It’s such a simple idea. It’s so basic.
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